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THE LEFT, THE RIGHT, AND CERTAINTY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
GENE R. NICHOL, JR.*

I have grave doubts whether legal theorists such as Roberto
Unger, Duncan Kennedy, and Mark Tushnet feel significant kinship with conservative constitutional advocates such as William
Rehnquist, Robert Bork, and Edwin Meese on many aspects of
American social and political life. Although the former group
may entertain vague dreams of a utopian replacement for our
present legal structure, the latter seems to yearn to turn the
clock back to clearer, "simpler" times. But in at least one area
of public discourse-the critique of modern constitutional decisionmaking-our friends on the right and the left seem to have
a good deal in common.
Their clearest area of mutual enthusiasm, without doubt, is
the notion that the malleability, pliability, contingency, instability,
indeterminacy, and general uncertainty of constitutional decisionmaking render it unacceptable. It is hardly the case, of course,
that critics of the far right and the far left of constitutional
discourse use this "discretion" argument for the same purposes,
or that they are motivated by similar political desires. Law has
always enjoyed an acute kinship with politics. Further, it is no
secret that both constitutional theory and constitutional adjudication are replete with often barely hidden agendas. Still, many
of the critics' claims run surprisingly parallel.
My focus in this Essay is this area of apparent common groundthe indeterminacy objection. In my view, the claim that constitutional law is illegitimate, or a mere apology for the status quo,
or an unacceptable threat of judicial tyranny, because it is, in a
significant way, indeterminate, is itself inconsistent with our
constitutional traditions. I explore four episodes of our constitutional history to make the case that the American brand of

* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Colorado. B.A., Oklahoma State University,
1973; J.D., University of Texas School of Law, 1976. A version of this Essay was delivered
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Mary for their comments and support. Finally, my colleagues at Colorado, Steve Smith,
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constitutionalism overtly embraces a good deal more uncertainty,
discretion, and change than its critics give it credit for.
Although I am a far cry from a historian, in my view the
attacks lodged by both originalists on the right and critical legal
scholars on the left turn out to be profoundly ahistorical. For
that reason, they miss much of the genius of our constitutional
decisionmaking. I refer here to "genius" in what I think is its
original sense: "peculiar or distinctive character," rather than a
different, and perhaps more common use of the word, "extraordinary intellectual power." Very few people have accused our
constitutional jurists of displaying "extraordinary intellectual
power." Throughout two centuries, however, our constitutional
tradition has proven more comfortable with and more embracing
of malleability, contradiction, discretion, uncertainty, subjectivity
and - not incidentally - optimism about the future, than the critics
of either the far right or the far left of American constitutional
discourse assume. As a result, the indeterminacy critique carries
far less power than its advocates assert.
I.

THE CRITIQUES

It takes no great legal mind, in fact it barely takes consciousness, to make out a claim that constitutional law is indeterminate.
A fancy theorist may be required to demonstrate that all legal
reasoning is unstable-that good lawyers and good judges can
make any case or virtually any case come out any way they wish.
But every first year law student has an exceptionally strong
sense that constitutional law is unstable. No candid theorist can
actually work Brown,' Bakke,2 Bowers,3 Buckley, 4 Bowsher,5 Baker,6
Bethel,7 Brandenburg,8 Broadrick,9 Branzburg,10 and Bivens" into
a coherent whole and still say anything meaningful about the
controversies presented. And that is limiting myself, obviously

1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
3. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
4. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
5. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
6. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
7. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
8. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
9. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
10. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
11. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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somewhat arbitrarily, to cases that start with a "B." Few constitutional rulings can be justified by unimpeachable reasoning
from particularized values that the Framers unambiguously constitutionalized. The question for constitutional scholars, therefore,
is what one chooses to do about that.
A.

The Right

Critics from the right, unlike their colleagues from the left,
present an appealing and forceful attack on much modern constitutional decisionmaking. Most frequently they draw upon what
has been correctly called a "civics book" 2 understanding of the
division of governmental authority in the United States. It is the
function of the legislature to make policy. Courts only implement
policies appropriately made by others. Judges enforce law; they
do not make it.
Added to this fundamental point, of course, is a second and
more controversial one. The Constitution contains many vaguely
worded concepts-due process, equal protection, cruel and unusual punishments, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion.
Decisions enforcing these provisions, even if seemingly consistent
with their language, are legitimate only if they are clearly (that
is, with a significant degree of certainty) based upon the Framers'
specifically recorded understandings of the constitutional commands. If we make something out of the notion of equality that
was not contemplated in 1868, we are making policy, not enforcing
law. As Judge Bork has put it, "once a court abandons the intention of [the Founders], the court is necessarily thrust into a
legislative posture."'1 And a judge who looks outside history in
4
this sense "always looks inside himself and nowhere else.'
An originalist, Bork has argued, avoids the difficulties of malleability, illegitimacy, and indeterminacy.15 Or as former Attorney
General Edwin Meese stated, originalism is essential to "avoid ...
the charge of incoherence."1 6 The Founders "chose their words

12. See Michael J. Perry, Interpretivim, Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection,
42 OHIO ST. L.J. 261, 276 (1981).
13. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 81 (1990).

14. Id. at 242.
15. Id. at 257.
16. Edwin Meese, Address Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), in THE
FEDERALIST SOCIETY, THE GREAT DEBATES: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 9
(1986).
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carefully . . . [and] debated at great length the most minute
points."' 7 Therefore, in relatively precise ways, the meaning of
the Constitution can be known. 18
This rootedness - in fairly clear and particularized historical
concepts of equality and liberty-allows people such as Gary
McDowell to speak of "fundamental constitutional values"' 9 or a
"constitution of fixed principles. '20 It also avoids, for Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the dangers of a "living Constitution. '21 (Though it
seems to me that the Chief Justice's Constitution becomes fairly
animated from time to time.P) And perhaps more radically, it
convinces Professor Lino Graglia that examples of actual unconstitutional practices are "extremely rare."' They can, as he
states, "be difficult to find in a standard constitutional law
casebook."'' Constitutional law, properly understood, should be a
matter of "little controversy or even interest."'

B. Th Left
What about the other side of the spectrum? Critical legal
scholars claim, with some influence and even more frequency,
that legal arguments are generally indeterminate. Skilled practitioners of the legal art can mount equally plausible arguments
and counterarguments-sometimes even based on the same
value-for the determination of legal disputes. Equally troubling,
law, like the liberal society it mirrors, is shot through with

17. Id.
18. See id. at 9-10.
19. GARY L. McDOWELL, CURBING THE COURTS 50 (1988).

20. Id. at 48.
21. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693,
693 (1976).
22. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522-32 (1980) (Stewart & Rehnquist,
JJ., dissenting) (arguing that a federal law favoring minority owned business contractors
violated the Equal Protection Clause, which requires strict neutrality on the basis of
race); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138-53 (1978) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the designation of Grand Central Station as a historic
landmark amounted to a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment because the designation
imposed involuntary restrictions for the benefit of the public at a substantial cost to the
owner); National League of Cities v. Usury, 426 U.S. 833, 835-56 (1976) (holding that
Congress lacked the authority under the Commerce Clause to extend minimun wage and
maximum hour protections to most state employees because of the interference with

traditional state governmental functions in the federal system).
23. Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Mysticism: The Aspirational Defense of Judicial
Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1344 (1985) (book review).
24. Id. at 1344 n.26.
25. Id. at 1344.
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contradictions and incoherencies. The list includes such notions
as liberty versus security, self-determination versus community,
economic empowerment versus restraint of the powerful, and
even Duncan Kennedy's "fundamental contradiction" -that the
"goal of individual freedom is at the same time dependent on
and incompatible with the communal coercive action that is
necessary to achieve it."26
In this arena, constitutional law is, of course, a sitting duck.
The Constitution itself obviously embraces notions of liberalism
and communitarianism, liberty and constraint, and, for that matter, liberty and equality which, at least at some level, clash or
contradict. All rights claims, to make it worse, must be weighed
against other governmental interests. So as Professor Tushnet
has argued, "what counts as a right . . . invariably turns out [to
be unstable] . . .produc[ing] no determinate consequences." 27 In

addition, anyone who has pushed hard at Marbury v. Madison's2
premises shares at least some kinship with Tushnet's claim that
"[j]udicial review . . . simultaneously creates the potential for
the tyranny of . . . judges," leaving us with a "choice of dicta-

torships: sometimes the majority will be the dictator, and sometimes the judges will."'
The constitutional law "project" for critical scholars, therefore,
seeks to show that various forms of arbitrariness, generated by
the conflict between the desires for economic growth and for
restraint on powerholders in a capitalist society, permeate constitutional law. Professor Roberto Unger has pressed the idea
further, claiming that constitutional argument and decisionmaking demand
a theory of [the] democratic republic that describes the proper
relation between state and society....
Without such a guiding vision, legal reasoning seems. condemned to a game of easy analogies. It will always be possible
to find . . .more or less convincing ways to make a set of
distinctions ... look credible. 0

26. Duncan Kennedy, The Structure ofBlackstone's Commentaries,28 BUFF.L. REV.205,
211 (1979).
27. Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1363-64 (1984). Or, to
state the argument differently, "[jiudges must choose which conceptions to rely on."
MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

57 (1988).
28. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
29. TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 16.
30. ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 8-9, 11 (1986).
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Looking at both of these movements together, one discovers a
good deal of shared real estate. Both camps build on the lessons
of the realists, though the originalists may have less enthusiam
for their heritage. They demonstrate, with some power, that
modern constitutional decisions, including the rulings of the
Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts, have employed large
doses of judicial discretion. The decisions and the rationales they
employ are, in general terms, constructed rather than deduced.
Moving so freely in the realm of choice, at least for those
enforcing the Constitution, is illegitimate. It presents, as well,
the possibility of judicial usurpation. Constitutional controversies
frequently implicate either contrasting or contradictory values,
and no overarching theory demonstrates conclusively which value
is to prevail or which institution should be allowed to have its
say.
From this point, of course, our friends part company. For those
on the right, discretion and policy choice cannot be rendered
legitimate. Speaking broadly, thirty-five years of "constitutional
decisionmaking" have resulted in the imposition of a set of liberal
political values on the American populace that could not be
sustained (and has, in fact, frequently been rejected) at the ballot
box. Either small or large segments of existing civil rights law
(depending on the critic) should be dismantled. For the critical
theorists, our contingent, constructed, and contradictory constitutional legacy serves merely to legitimate an otherwise indefensible and oppressive status quo. The solution is to abandon the
enterprise-to scrap the "rights-talk" 31-in favor, "come the rev-

olution,"
of more authentic, unalienated, and transformative pol32
itics.

I care less about these proposed solutions than their underlying
premise. Folded within these critiques is a heavy claim that the
discretion, choice, and responsibility presented in constitutional
adjudication, and the uncertainty and malleability that necessarily
arise from those exercises of choice, remove constitutional decisionmaking from the umbrella of legitimacy in our governmental
structure. I think that undergirding premise is wrong. I turn to
several major aspects of our constitutional legacy to try to prove
the point.
31. Michael J. Perry, Taking Neither Rights-Talk nor the "Critique of Rights" Too
Seriously, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1405 (1984); Tushnet, supra note 27, at 1386.
32. See Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984);
Tushnet, supra note 27, at 1386.
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OUR CONSTITUTIONAL LEGACY

A. Madison
In any constitutional history, Madison has to be a major, most
likely the major, figure. Not surprisingly, given his brilliance and
given the fact that he struggled perhaps more than any other
American with the problem of what a constitution should say,
Madison spoke with some specificity on the issues of certainty,
predictability, and uniformity in constitutional interpretation. His
views on the value of original intention provide a first and easy
example of his belief in the malleability of constitutional law.
Madison, one will recall, refused to allow the timely publication
of his notes on the constitutional convention. They would, of
course, have been very relevant to the constitutional disputes
that marked both the Marshall Court and Madison's long public
career. But Madison thought it preferable, in his words, to wait
until the terms of the Constitution were "well settled by practice."u
While debating in the Virginia ratification convention, Madison
apologized for the fact that he had known some of the specific
intentions of the Framers. 5 He conceded that this knowledge
was a possible source of bias in his attempts to figure out what
the Constitution meant.- Why? Because he was aware that "the
document must speak for itself, and [that private] intention cannot
be substituted for the established rules of interpretation." 37 Those
rules of interpretation included the common law notion of "usus,"' '
that is, patterns of "actual government practice and judicial
precedents."3 9 These actions, not the specific goals of the draftsmen, would determine the intention of the Constitution. "It could
not but happen, . . ." Madison*wrote, "that difficulties and dif-

33. See Adrienne Koch, Introduction to JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 ix (Ohio Univ. Press 1966).
34. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821), reprinted in 3
LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 228 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott &
Co. 1865) [hereinafter MADISON'S LETTERS].
35. See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent,
98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 936-37 (1985).
36. Id.
37. Letter from James Madison to Martin Van Buren (July 5, 1830), reprinted in 4
MADISON'S LETTERS, supra note 34, at 89.
38. Letter from James Madison to John Davis (1832) (never sent), reprinted in 4
MADISON'S LETTERS, supra note 34, at 232, 242.

39. Powell, supra note 35, at 939.
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ferences of opinion might . . arise in expounding terms and
phrases necessarily used in such a charter . . . and that it might

require a regular course of practice to liquidate and settle the
meaning of some of them." 40 The Constitution, for Madison, was
a public document, and its interpretation was in the end a public
41
process.
No better example of this methodology in action can be found
than Madison's decision not to veto the Second National Bank
Act.42 Twenty years earlier, as a congressman rather than president, Madison had argued that a national bank was unconstitutional. When he signed the Bank Act as president, therefore, he
was accused of expediency. He responded, though, that "the
inconsistency is apparent only."' Two decades of contrary practice had rendered his private opinion irrelevant, in favor of what
he called "a construction put on the Constitution by the nation,
which having made it, had the supreme right to declare its
meaning. '44 The accepted "use" of the Commerce Clause could
not be separated from its proper interpretation.
Consider the process Madison envisioned. The "terms and
phrases" of the Constitution are obviously subject to a wide
variety of interpretations, at least in some instances. When
courts, or other government actors for that matter, engage in
constitutional interpretation, they will, of necessity, have a variety of options open to them. The choices they make and the
extent to which the citizenry accepts those choices will fashion,
over time, the "correct" interpretation of the charter. Its correctness would not be altered by a demonstration that the specific
intentions of the Framers were otherwise. Apparently, Madison
did not find debilitating the fact that skilled lawyers could stand
before courts and develop "equally plausible counterarguments,"
or that the preliminary results were "unstable," or presented the
"potential" for judicial tyranny (to quote our friends on the left).
There is a reason for that, of course, to which I turn at the
conclusion of this Essay. Madison was charged with actually doing
something. When you "have" to do something, perfection is set
aside pretty quickly. Would it be surprising, Madison wrote, "if
40. Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), reprinted in 3
MADISON'S LETTERS, supra note 34, at 143, 145.
41. Powell, supra note 35, at 941.
42. Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 73, 3 Stat. 266.
43. Letter from James Madison to C.E. Hayes (Feb. 25, 1831), reprintedin 4 MADISON'S
LETTERS, supra note 34, at 164-65.
44. Letter from James Madison to the Marquis de Lafayette (Nov., 1826), reprintedin
3 MADISON'S LETTERS, supra note 34, at 538.
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under the pressure of all these difficulties, the Convention should
have been forced into some deviations from the artificial structure
and regular symmetry, which an abstract view of the subject
might lead an ingenious theorist to bestow on a Constitution
45
planned in his closet or in his imagination?"
Madison also referred to the "terms and phrase necessarily
used '46 in constitutional construction. Being quite a linguistics
student himself, Madison no doubt employed the term "necessarily used" by design. Speaking in The Federalist,he wrote that
at least "three sources of vague and incorrect definitions . . .
must produce a certain degree of obscurity" in the interpretation
48
of the Constitution. 47 First, the "indistinctness of the object[s]"

regulated hampers clarity. Governmental powers, restraints, and
concepts are not exactly "works of nature"- certain in and of
themselves, both in terms of their existence and in their susceptibility to scientific description. Second, if we can get beyond
this problem, consider "the imperfection of the organ of conception,'

49

namely mankind. Precise limits between "common law,

the statute law, the maritime law, [and] the ecclesiastical law,"
for example, "remain still to be clearly

. . .

established in Great

Britain, where accuracy in such subjects has been more industriously pursued than in any other part of the world." Not to
mention the fundamental differences between the "three great
provinces, the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary"-in which a
profound "obscurity

. .

. reigns . . . which puzzle[s] the greatest

adepts in political science." 51
Finally, there is, in Madison's view, the "inadequateness of the
vehicle of ideas. ' 52 Language, or "the medium through which the
conceptions of men are conveyed to each other," provides "a
fresh embarrassment."' ' All new laws are "indeterminate""though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on
the fullest and most mature deliberation, [they] are considered
as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning [is]

45. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 238 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
46. Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), reprinted in 3
MADISON'S LETTERS, supra note 34, at 143, 145 (emphasis added).

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

THE FEDERALIST

IdId.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 236.
at 235.
at 237.
at 236.

No. 37, supra note 45, at 237 (emphasis added).
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liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions
54
and adjudications."
These are not the words of a theorist who thinks that constitutional decisionmaking can be performed by rote. Nor are they
the ideas of one who thinks that nonmechanical judicial interpretation is, by definition, a usurpation of power. Madison brings to
mind, instead, Alexander Bickel's dictum that "[e]ven when law
pretends to be a science, it is not, after all, mathematics." 55 He
accepted play in the joints of constitutional interpretation because, in short, he saw no other option, or at least no other
viable one. The critique from the right-that all interpretive
moves beyond the specific intentions of the Founders are illegitimate-Madison rejected explicitly. In my view, Madison would
have repudiated much of the critique from the left as well, but
here perhaps with what lawyers used to call a general demurrer.
There is contradiction, there is discretion, there is choice, and
there is even the potential for tyranny. How could it be otherwise? But what system could be proposed to operate more beneficially?
B.

The Ambitious Role of the Early American Lawyer

This section broadens the focus of the Essay from one Framer,
even if he is the most important one, to a wider sense of the
lives and values of early American statesmen. I have in mind
particularly one subset of the first few generations of American
political decisionmakers -lawyers and judges. From time to time,
I hear complaints about the pervasive influence of lawyers. Lawyers, the rumors go, not only run the judiciary, but also the
legislature, the executive branch, political parties, and everything
else associated with power. In my view, there is not that much
truth in the broad claim. I know that our legislature in Colorado
is not dominated by lawyers, in fact they are few and far between.
The same is true, I seem to recall, in Virginia. I at least know
that when I am in Denver lobbying for more money for the law
school, I wish that there were a lot more lawyers to talk to.
Apparently normal people do not think a strong case arises for
significant public sacrifice in order to produce more lawyers.
But things were different in this country during the period
from the Revolution to the Civil War. Twenty-five of the fifty-

54. Id.
55. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

97 (1978).
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six signers of the Declaration of Independence, for example, were
lawyers. Thirty-one of the fifty-five members of the constitutional
convention were members of the legal profession. Perhaps most
surprising to us, thirteen of the first sixteen American presidents
were lawyers. That is an amazing statistic, of course. I somehow
doubt that today a lawyer could be elected president of the
United States. These figures, however, illustrate a point made
in a great book written by Robert Ferguson, Law and Letters in
American Culture.6 In Ferguson's view, lawyers "completely...
'57
dominate[d] American politics until the Civil War.
So what? Ferguson also demonstrates convincingly that early
American lawyers and judges shared a much different view of
the roles of law and the legal profession than those that prevail
today. That view, which I will describe, has fallen into desuetude.
Still, it sits uneasily with a claim that the art of judging, particularly constitutional judging, which so directly implicates our
efforts at societal self-definition, is a mechanical enterprise that
must be clearly rooted in what has been decreed before. Early
American lawyers used a different vocabulary than we do, one
of natural law and God-given justice. They also saw themselves
as engaged in a different enterprise than the one we typically
espouse-they were "discovering" the "natural" order of social
and political relations.
But the "project" they envisioned was clearly an all-encompassing one in which the legal profession played a crucial, creative, and initiating role. It, like Madison's view of the rigors of
constitutional interpretation, is a central feature of our constitutional tradition. It cannot be squared with the claim that
uncertainty and discretion render the judicial enforcement of
constitutional norms illegitimate.
Let me give a few examples. Listen to the way colonial
Americans described the education necessary for lawyering. In
a 1794 lecture given at Columbia University, Chancellor James
Kent demanded that aspiring lawyers "master the Greek and
Latin classics as well as moral philosophy, history, logic, and
mathematics" because only by being "'well read in the whole
circle of the arts and sciences'" could they form "'an accurate
acquaintance with the general principles of Universal Law.' "

56. ROBERT FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS iN AMERICAN CULTURE (1984).

57. Id. at 17.
58. Id. at 28 (quoting James Kent, An Introductory Lecture to a Course of Law
Lectures (delivered Nov. 17, 1794), reprintedin 3 COLUm. L. REV. 330-43 (1903)).
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Joseph Story claimed that the democratic lawyer must constantly
"'drink in the lessons and the spirit of philosophy.' ",9 Rufus
Choate preached that a would-be practitioner must "[s]oak [his]
mind with Cicero," 60 because literature and politics were inevitably merged in the lawyer's general call to "civitas," or the
obligation to serve the higher sense of civic and public purpose61
Key constitutional Framer James Wilson claimed that the true
lawyer possessed a "'philosophy of the human mind' that allowed
him to 'become well acquainted with the whole moral world' and
to 'discover the abstract reason of all laws.' "62
Jefferson, whom we forget was generally understood in his
day as the country's greatest legal scholar, wrote that "'history,
politics, ethics, physics, oratory, poetry, [and] criticism [are] necessary . . . to [become] an accomplished lawyer.' " Of course,
Jefferson also prescribed a plan of law study that included, each
day, intensive study of three languages from eight o'clock to
noon, politics and history in the afternoon, and poetry, criticism,
rhetoric and oratory from "'Dark to Bed-time.'"64 That, you will
notice, included no time for nightly visits to the taverns of
Williamsburg.
Jefferson, of course, studied law for five years. But there were
also a great many Patrick Henrys in colonial America- "Blackstone" lawyers briefly trained in a law office, who practiced from
three "legal sources": Blackstone, Shakespeare, and the Bible.
Lincoln was the last Blackstone lawyer to be president of the
United States-we have never done so well, before or since. Still,
these practices were outside what has been called the "controlling
aspirations of [the American] intellectual elite." 6 Even here, the
point is the same for my purposes. Early American lawyers and

59. Id. at 66 (quoting Joseph Story, A Discourse Pronounced at the Inaugurationof the
Author as Dane Professor of Law in Harvard University, August 25, 1829, in THE
MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 528-29 (William Wetmore Story ed., Boston,

Little, Brown 1852)).
60. Id. at 75 (quoting Rufus Choate, quoted in CLAUDE M. FUESS, RUFUS CHOATE: THE
WIZARD OF THE LAW 222 (1928)).

61. Id. at 72-78.
62. Id. at 60 (quoting James Wilson, Lectures on Law Delivered in the College of
Philadelphiain the Years 1790 and 1791, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 90-91 (Robert
Green McCloskey ed., 1967) [hereinafter WORKS OF WILSON]).
63. Id. at 28 (quoting letter from Thomas Jefferson to Daloney Terrell (Feb. 26, 1821),
in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 318-23 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E.

Bergh eds., 1905)).
64. Id. (quoting Thomas Jefferson, quoted in 11 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 420-

26 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905)).
65. Id. at 29.
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judges-unlike their modern day counterparts-were schooled
in, and employed in their practices, general knowledge. "Technical" legal competence paled in importance compared to skills of
oratory, eloquence, philosophy, politics, religion, and literature.
Indeed, as Ferguson has written, "[o]ne can hardly exaggerate
66
the importance of general learning in early American law."
There was "a remarkable symbiosis between law and literary
aspiration."67
This meant, as Chancellor Kent argued, that lawyers were seen
as "'ex officio natural guardians of the laws,' and 'sentinels over
the constitutions and liberties of the country.' "6 In John Adams's
view, it was the responsibility of lawyers to "proclaim 'the laws,
the rights, [and] the generous plan of power' delivered down from
remote antiquity."6 9 James Wilson, one of the Constitution's principal draftsmen, wrote that the true lawyer "ranged not without
rule, but without restraint, in the rich, the variegated and the
spacious fields of science!' "70
This vision of law at least partially explains to students of
constitutional history some surprising phenomena: the fact, for
example, that Justice Joseph Story (perhaps our preeminent
judicial constitutional theorist) would describe the goal of judicial
reasoning as the realization of "'the splendid visions of Cicero,
dreaming over the majestic fragments of his perfect republic.' "171
Or that John Marshall's greatest constitutional opinions failed to
cite a single case. As Ferguson has written, "[e]ach argument
was grounded instead upon appeals to the principiaof American
'72
civilization and upon the grand, inclusive style [of] Blackstone.
Early Americans were obsessed with self-definition, and the
development of judicial review went a long way towards establishing a lawyer's hegemony over the description of republican
ideals.

66. Id. at 66.
67. Id. at 25.
68. Id. (quoting James Kent, Address Delivered Before the Law Association of New York
City (Oct. 21, 1836), in MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF CHANCELLOR JAMES KENT 235-36 (William
Kent ed., Boston, Little, Brown 1898)).
69. Id. at 18 (quoting John Adams, A DISSERTATION ON THE CANON AND FEUDAL LAW
(1765), reprintedin 3 THE LIFE AND WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 445-64 (Charles Francis Adams
ed., Boston, Little, Brown 1850-56)).
70. Id. at 65 (quoting 1 WORKS OF WILSON, supra note 62, at 69-70).
71. Id. (quoting Joseph Story, Progress of Jurisprudence,An Address Delivered before
the Members of the Suffolk Bar, at Their Anniversary, September 4, 1821, at Boston, in
THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY, supra note 59, at 215).

72. I& at 23.
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This concept of the law and lawyering, quite obviously, has
not survived. Jacksonian democracy questioned the legitimacy of
such an ex officio 'lite. Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman launched
a cultural assault on the notion of civic republicanism. For Thoreau,
the virtue of lawyers was "'the virtue of pigs in a litter, which
lie close together to keep each other warm.' " Around the same
time, Emerson claimed that "the world is nothing, the man is
hand, wrote "I give you myself,
all. ' 74 Whitman, on the other
75
before preaching or law."
By the 1840's, oratory came to play a less significant role in
the courtroom. Jurisprudence became more technical and positive.
John Marshall, Joseph Story, Daniel Webster, and James Kent
died despairing over the fate of their country. By the end of the
nineteenth century, Oliver Wendell Holmes would deride what
he called "'Story's simple philosophizing.' "76 He refered to lawyers as that "'little army of specialists'
and declared war on
his predecessors, writing: "For my own part, I often doubt
whether it would not be a gain if every word of moral significance
could be banished from the law altogether," so that we could
"convey legal ideas uncolored by anything outside the law. '78 The
idea of stripping legal norms of everything outside the law would
be heartening to critical scholars of both the right and the left.
It would not, however, have been even comprehensible, much
less desirable, to an early American lawyer.
That is exactly the point. The founding generation had an
antiquated vision of the force, character, and process of law. I
do not suppose that we would want to recapture that. Still, the
notion that judges can act appropriately only when their decisions
are based clearly upon unambiguous dictates of positive and
specific legal commands was as far outside the range of experience of early American lawyers as their natural law aspirations
are to us. Jurisprudence was an all-encompassing science which
",77

73. Id. at 239 (quoting Henry David Thoreau).
74. Or, to put it another way, "in yourself is the law of all nature." Ralph Waldo
Emerson, The American Scholar, reprinted in 1 THE WORKS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON

112-13 (Edward W. Emerson ed., 1883).
75. WALT WHITMAN, Song of the Open Road, in THE LEAVES OF GRASS 158 (1900).
76. FERGUSON, suepra note 56, at 288 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Use of Law
Schools: Oration Before the Harvard Law School Association at Cambridge, November 5,
1886, on the 250th Anniversary of Harvard University, in THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 40-41 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1962)).
77. Id. at 290 (quoting Holmes, supra note 76, at 36).
78. Id. (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457,
464 (1897)).
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sought to bring human relations in line with the commands of a
sophisticated and still-unfolding moral universe. There was, I
suggest, no single, well-marked, and closely channelled road to
the achievement of Cicero's republic. But that did not make
constitutional law illegitimate.C. The Fourteenth Amendment
My last two ventures into constitutional history will be more
brief and more pointed. Both involve the Civil War and its
amendments; and, if anything, they present interpretive issues
that are even more pervasive than Madison's thought or the
ethos of colonial lawyers. The first discussion concerns the history
of the Fourteenth Amendment itself. The Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment make up the
heart of modern constitutional law. Fourteenth Amendment rulings such as Brown v. Board of Education79 Roe v. Wade,80 and
Frontierov. Richardson81 have spawned a significant industry of
constitutional theorizing. Debate over the way the Fourteenth
Amendment should be interpreted is, to a significant extent, the
debate of modern constitutional law. Some advocate a tight
interpretive stance, allegedly based on intention. Others seek the
vigorous use of the "majestic generalities 8 2 of the Amendment
in order to improve our social order.
But what was the purpose of the Amendment? Professor William
Nelson has written an excellent book addressing that question 3
The best answer appears to be that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, when compared to our uses of the provision,
were speaking to a different sort of audience, using different
sorts of concepts, for different purposes, and with contradictory
rationales. The likely case is that first and foremost the reconstruction Congress was seeking to codify, in dramatic terms, its
victory over the South. By guaranteeing federal privileges and
immunities, due process, and equal protection, the Framers could
say, most effectively, that the regime of the pre-war South could

79. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
80. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
81. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).

82. William J. Brennan, Speech to Text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985), reprintedin THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, supra note 16, at 11 (1986).
83. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988).
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not constitutionally be resurrected. Beyond that, in Nelson's view,
they were largely uninterested in issues of bureaucratic enforcement of the Amendment's commands. Those are our concerns,
not theirs. They wrote "to reaffirm the lay public's longstanding
rhetorical commitment to general principles of equality, individual
rights and local self-rule."
Of course, to our present sensibilities, these three conceptsequality, individual rights, and local control-are not only vague
and amorphous, but in many instances they are contradictory.
But the Framers of the Amendment, for several reasons, were
not inclined to clear up these potential conflicts. First, it was
less clear to them than it is to us that the principles would
actually collide. One needs a stronger sense of the actual operations of an equality concept, for example, to understand what
other concerns it might subsume. Second, they were not speaking
to philosophers and legal theorists. They were not theorists
themselves. The language of Section One5 was designed for
persuasion, not intellectual coherence. 86 Most fundamentally, the
Amendment was seen as a rhetorical commitment, charging the
nation to do its duty concerning the newly freed slaves and loyal
unionists. Third, real and unreconciled disagreement about the
nature of the equality demanded by the provision persisted. The
ambiguity and the capaciousness of the Amendment's terms allowed the Framers to retain the support of political coalitions
that concurred only in vague ideas, not specific programs.8
To give examples of this amorphous process is easy. Mixing
notions of liberty and equality, Justice Chase declared that the
most fundamental of natural rights was the power to exercise
the same rights as others.8 Congressman Bingham, a drafter of
the Amendment, constantly referred to the equality of natural
rights.8 9 The higher law/natural rights basis of the provision also,
ironically by our lights, included concepts of duty: God required

84. Id. at 8.
85. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1.
86. Cf.NELSON, supra note 83, at 60-63.
87. See id.
88. Id- at 22.
89. Id. at 73.
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that people behave in various ways. 90 Some supporters indicated
that equality meant an equal place in terms of "intelligence and
virtue." 91 Others claimed that, at most, the phrase recognized an
equal need for physical protection by the government. 92 The
suffrage issue was a particularly warm potato. For example, the
Ohio Republican Party in 1866 openly advocated black suffrage
93
in some counties, and in some opposed it.
National leaders
decided not to settle the question because most would assume
that "their" Amendment was the one that had passed. Charles
Sumner wrote that Section One was "like a sign on the highway
with different inscriptions on each side, so that people approaching the sign from the opposite directions necessarily see it dif94
ferently."
What, then, are the demands of certainty in interpreting such
a provision? Originalists apparently would allow only the ideas
on which all or virtually all Framers agreed. But this lowest
common denominator approach codifies a supposed compromise
that did not in fact exist; or, more accurately, it is not a compromise at all. Why should it be the case that the least ambitious
interpreters, in every instance, win the day? Critics on the left
must assume, in turn, that any constitutional provision that is
subject to such varying interpretations cannot actually be deemed
law; it is too malleable, uncertain, indeterminate, subject to
manipulation. But can you imagine any conclusion more at odds
with the perceptions of the American populace? When we enact
a constitutional amendment, whatever else we may have in mind,
we all think we are doing something that will have an impact in
the real world.
D. Lincoln and Aspiration
The final historical foray this Essay addresses is, in my view,
the most important one. If we back up a few years to the period
just before the Civil War, Lincoln's vision of the Constitution
moves to center stage. What a telling vision it is. Recall that
one of the central questions addressed in the Lincoln-Douglas
debates in 1858 was the meaning of the Declaration of Independ-

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 23.
rd. at 87.
Id. at 88-89.
Id. at 143.
Id.

1198

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1181

ence and, less directly, the way that the Declaration's goals should
affect the meaning of the Constitution itself. Responding to Judge
Douglas's claims for "popular sovereignty" and support for the
Dred Scott decision, 95 Lincoln demanded that we "readopt the
Declaration of Independence, and with it the practices and polic[ies]
which harmonize with it."96 In Lincoln's view, our constitutive
principles were more basic and more profound than the specifics
set forth in the constitutional text. Framing an illustration based
upon Biblical metaphor, he explained:
There is something back of [the Constitution and the Union]
entwining itself more closely about the human heart. That
something, is the principle of "Liberty to all"-the principle
that clears the path for all-gives hope to all-and.

. .

enter-

prize and industry to all.
The expression of that principle, in our Declaration of Independence... was the word "fitlyspoken" which has proved an
"apple of gold".

. .

. The Union and the Constitution, are the

picture of silver, subsequently framed around it .... The picture was made for the apple-not the apple for the picture.
So let us act, that neither picture, or apple shall ever be
blurred or bruised or broken.97

Of course, drawing this link back to the fountainhead of the
Constitution -the

Declaration-was not the end of Lincoln's so-

journ. He realized the seeming inconsistencies of the Declaration.
As Martin Luther King, Jr. reminded a century later: "that
document was always a declaration of intent rather than of
reality." 98 Slavery was only the grossest of the realities that
haunted it. The "all" who were created equal were, at best,
white, propertied, protestant males. Lincoln argued, though, that
the Framers of the Declaration
did not mean to assert the obvious untruth, that all were then
actually enjoying.

. .

equality, nor yet, that they were about

95. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
96. Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Peoria, Illinois, in Reply to Senator Douglas (Oct. 16,
1859), reprintedin SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 44 (T. Harry
Williams ed., 1943).
97. Abraham Lincoln, Fragment on the Constitution and the Union (Jan. 1861), reprinted
in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 169 (Roy Basler ed., 1953).
98. Martin Luther King, Jr., WORDS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING 52 (Coretta S. King ed.,
1983).
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to confer it immediately upon them. . . . They meant simply
to declare the right, so that enforcement of it might follow as
fast as circumstances should permit. They meant to set up a
standard maxim for free society, which could be familiar to all
and revered by all; constantly looked to, constantly labored
for, and even though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly spreading and deepening
its influence.99
The problem with the Dred Scott decision, then, was not just
that it sought to bind the nation to a particular course in dealing
with its most devastating problem. Dred Scott itself, in Gary
Jacobsohn's words, "failed to acknowledge the moral dimensions
of American constitutionaism."'010 In Lincoln's view, it failed to
reflect the "national striving to fulfill the substantive ideals of
the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence."'' 1 That
aspiration was the "leading object"'0 2 of the government for which
the Civil War itself was fought.
But how can the aspirations of American constitutionalism be
squared with the certainty critiques of the left and right? Our
vision of "liberty," in Lincoln's words, will be "constantly looked
to, constantly labored for,. . . constantly approximated...
though never perfectly attained."'0 3 Its "approximation" is, by
definition, an imperfect process, one that moves with the developments of our culture, allowing "enforcement . . . as fast as
circumstances should permit."'1 4 It assumes, even, "partial and
temporary departures, from necessity."'1 It will not be pristine
and neatly consistent and representative of the latest trends of
political philosophy. It is, after all, the movement of a nation and
a culture, like law itself.

99. Abraham Lincoln, The Dred Scott Decision, Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 26,
1857), reprinted in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 361 (Roy Basler ed.,
1946).
100. GARY JACOBSOHN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DECLINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
ASPIRATION 8 (1986).

in

101. Id. at 95.
102. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), rep7inted
SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 96, at 125, 139.
103. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to H.L. Pierie and others (Apr. 6, 1859), in ABRAHAM

LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, supra note 99, at 361.

104. Id.
105. Lincoln, supra note 102, at 140.
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CHOICE

I have tried to show, in general terms, that the indeterminacy
critique-the demand for certainty-sells short our constitutional

tradition. At best the critiques are partial, for the need to make
choices will always be with us, and the need to explain why
certain choices are preferable to others cannot be successfully,
or courageously, put aside. In the broadest sense, Holmes was
right when he wrote that in law "certainty generally is illusion
and repose is not the destiny of man."'06 The straight fact is that
constitutional decisionmaking, like all legal decisionmaking, is
value-laden. As Charles Black has written, "to ask that constitutional law be free from value judgments thus implicated is to
ask that it not be law.' 10

7

And the general principles that make

up the central features of our Constitution, as Madison acknowledged, produce uncertainty in law, not certainty. The "whole
subject-matter of jurisprudence," as Justice Cardozo concluded,
is "more plastic, more malleable, the moulds less definitively
cast.

. .

than most of us.

.

. have been accustomed to believe.' l 8

To say that the judicial enforcement of sometimes ambiguous
constitutional provisions is illegitimate is to argue for a different
historical course than we have taken. And we have been wise,
at least on this optimistic front, in the choice that we have made.
This is, of course, part of a broader point. Holmes complained
about scholarly theorists saying that "the academic life is but
half-life,. . . utter[ing] smart things that cost you nothing...

from a cloister."'0 9 We do not have to intentionally beat up on
theorists to openly recognize that most of law, like most of life,
is choice. As Holmes also reminded, "life is an art not a thing
which one can work out successfully by abstract rules.""' Madison, Jefferson, Marshall, Story, Lincoln, Brandeis, and Warren
knew that. They also knew, as Adlai Stevenson wrote, that "to
act with enthusiam and faith is the condition of acting greatly.'
We should remember that lesson ourselves.

106. Holmes, supra note 78, at 466.
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